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SYMPOSIUM: PANDEMICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
FEDERALISM AND CONTAGION: 
REEVALUATING THE ROLE OF THE CDC 
Kyle J. Connors* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and its 
associated illness COVID-19 has reignited questions of public health 
federalism. That debate centers on the optimal distribution of power 
between the federal and state governments during a pandemic. 
Governments have contended with contagious disease throughout human 
history. Varied responses include ancient Rome’s development of sanitary 
engineering1 and the Venetian government’s quarantine of ships returning 
from the Crusades.2 Contagious disease has also played an active role in 
shaping United States history.3 Beyond most living American’s 
memories, but embedded in the national experience includes numerous 
waves of yellow fever, smallpox, cholera, and the infamous 1918 Spanish 
flu.4 In response to these epidemics, localities and states have applied 
various methods of control. These state and local control measures have 
often been inconsistent, supported by little scientific evidence, and 
adversely influenced by local politics. 
This essay argues for a rebalancing of public health federalism to 
increase federal leadership during public health crises by empowering the 
* Kyle J. Connors, student at the University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank Professor 
Margaret Foster Riley for her guidance on this piece. For helpful comments and discussions, I also 
owe thanks to Erin McGaughey, Anthony Jadick, Charles Watson and Jacob Young. All errors are 
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1. Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense 
against Dangerous Individuals, 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 329, 332 (1989).  
2. Id. at 333.
3. Top 10 Terrible Epidemics, TIME MAGAZINE ONLINE, http://content.time.com/time/
specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,2027479,00.html [https://perma.cc/DL5W-BGKK]. 
4. The Most Dangerous Epidemics in U.S. History, HEALTHLINE (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.healthline.com/health/worst-disease-outbreaks-history#1 [https://perma.cc/VD7K-
U4US]. 
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Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Part I outlines the background 
authorities operating during a public health crisis for the state and federal 
governments, respectively. Part II argues that decisions on sanitary 
ordinances such as the closing of schools, public areas, and individual 
safety measures should be more heavily influenced by real-time federal 
policy. History demonstrates that local decision-makers can treat public 
health crises too casually by failing to implement mitigation measures or, 
on occasion, institute draconian but ineffective measures. Former FDA 
Director Scott Gottlieb pointed out recent local inaction hinders a national 
response.5 Instead, more decisions made at the federal level would 
insulate local officials from the winds of local politics, and enable a more 
coordinated and effective response. Part III argues for a more aggressive 
statutory authorization of the federal government’s quarantine authority. 
In the past, local governments have instituted arbitrary and counter-
productive quarantines. Additionally, confusion remains as to the federal 
government’s authority over the subject today. Part IV briefly explores 
the constitutional authorities for the aforementioned recommendations. 
Our success in the past 100 years in the control and eradication of many 
contagious diseases leaves case law in public health federalism largely 
underdeveloped. This ambiguity is compounded by the evolution of law 
in the past two hundred years, as the scope of the federal government’s 
power has grown. In all, the changes advocated for represent a significant 
shift in public health federalism in the way crises are approached. With 
the law unchanged, our system of dual sovereignty during a pandemic has 
the potential to dangerously blur the lines of authority, leading to an ill-
coordinated response. 
II. BACKGROUND AUTHORITY DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS
In the U.S., states possess police power, guaranteed by the 
Constitution, which includes power over public health.6 State police 
power, an expression of civil authority, comes from the 10th Amendment, 
which reserves states the rights and powers “not delegated to the United 
States.”7 States thus have power to promulgate and enforce laws in the 
furtherance of public health. Public health is defined as the promotion of 
the health of people and communities, which includes responding to 
5. Scott Gottlieb (@ScottGottliebMD), Twitter (Mar. 5, 2020, 9:11 AM),
https://twitter.com/ScottGottliebMD/status/1235568500774768640?s=20 [https://perma.cc/J675-
6T6X]. 
6. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (noting that “the traditional police power
of the States is . . . to provide for the public health, safety and morals).  
7. U.S. Const. amend. X. 
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contagious disease threats.8 In addition, medical practice licensure and 
many hospital regulations are also within the province of the states.9 Local 
health departments have traditionally been on the front lines of responding 
to public health crises. These entities are responsible for maintaining 
health in communities and responding to contagious disease outbreaks 
within their jurisdictions. Local health departments, in conjunction with 
mayors and state legislatures, have also traditionally exercised authority 
over sanitary regulations, which include social distancing regulations in 
response to an outbreak. 
Federal authority in public health crises comes from the Commerce 
Clause and the Tax and Spending Clause.10 At the beginning of a potential 
outbreak, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) is 
authorized to provide substantial support for states at the request of the 
state’s health official.11 The CDC can also provide technical and financial 
support for disease investigation and control.12 The CDC, while located 
primarily in Atlanta, is still an agency under HHS, so their actions are 
authorized under the general authority of the HHS Secretary.13 If the 
outbreak rises to the level of a “public health emergency,” the Secretary 
is authorized to respond beyond just supporting state and local 
governments. The main authority is Section 319 of the Public Health 
Service Act.14 This authorization allows the Secretary to draw from an 
emergency fund, authorize under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act for the 
use of unapproved tests and treatments, and finally, waive a variety of 
administrative requirements for health care providers.15 A “public health 
emergency” was recently declared by the acting HHS Secretary in 
response to the H1N1 influenza outbreak in April of 2009.16 In even more 
extreme circumstances, an emergency could be declared under the 
Stafford Act. Emergency declarations under the Stafford Act occur upon 
8. What is Public Health?, AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION,
https://www.apha.org/what-is-public-health [https://perma.cc/ZT5E-3SL8].  
9. Navigating State Medical Licensure, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
https://www.ama-assn.org/residents-students/career-planning-resource/navigating-state-medical-
licensure [https://perma.cc/3HEQ-FY39]. 
10. Brian Kamoie et. al., Assessing Laws and Legal Authorities for Public Health Emergency
Legal Preparedness, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 23, 24 (2008). 
11. Kathleen S. Swendiman, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40560, The 2009 Influenza (H1N1)
Pandemic: Selected Legal Issues, 1 (2009); 42 U.S.C. §§ 243(c) (1985), 247(b) (2010).  
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 243(c) (1985), 247(b) (2010).
13. U.S. Dept. Health and Human Services, HHS Organizational Chart (Jan. 13 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/orgchart/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y96E-9S24]. 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 247(a) (2019).
15. Swendiman, supra note 12, at 1. 
16. Id.
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the request of a state governor, when “the disaster is of such severity and 
magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State 
and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is 
necessary.”17 Once an emergency has been declared, additional resources 
from the federal government are available to assist the state and local 
efforts.18 There is some debate over whether a pandemic would qualify as 
a “major disaster” under the Stafford Act because a “natural 
catastrophe”19 is required. However, the George W. Bush administration 
appears to have considered flu pandemics eligible for major disaster 
assistance.20 Beyond grants and seldom interventions, the federal 
government has taken a hands-off approach to public health directives in 
states. 
III. NECESSARY REFORM OF LOCAL ORDINANCE PROCESS
This section argues for Congress to formally empower the CDC to 
influence local policy, and for the CDC to informally influence state and 
local governments more directly. Both preemptively and throughout a 
pandemic, local public health measures are essential to the containment 
and mitigation of an outbreak. Local ordinances and state laws have 
historically taken many forms to respond to this invisible threat. The 
variability in local responses has the potential to lead to a collective action 
problem, among others. One location may adopt draconian sanitary 
measures, and another proximate locality may use a rather relaxed 
approach. The resulting disorganization and increase in cases can 
exacerbate a pandemic and damage the government’s overall public 
health credibility. Just as a rational actor might refrain from getting 
vaccinated if they know everyone else received the vaccine, a locality may 
refrain from imposing strict regulations if they know areas surrounding 
them have implemented them. A locality then would gain much of the 
benefits of disease containment, without incurring much of the costs. 
This calls for a more centralized response involving the federal 
government in order to gain uniformity within local sanitary measures. 
While sanitary ordinances combating disease have been in use in the 
United States for hundreds of years, they gained particular prominence 
within localities during the Spanish flu outbreak of 1918, which killed 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a) (2013). 
18. See Kristen DiGirolamo, Legal Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza: Is Virginia Ready, 
13 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 385 (2010). 
19. 42 U.S.C. §5122(2) (2018).
20. Swendiman, supra note 12, at 4. 
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more than an estimated 670,000 Americans.21 Types of non-medical 
sanitary ordinances generally fall into the following categories: travel 
controls, decreased social mixing, mandatory individual actions (such as 
mask-wearing), and civil confinement (stay at home orders or centralized 
quarantine). The purpose of these responses is to slow the rate of new 
infections by reducing social contacts and decreasing the likelihood of 
transmission. These ordinances most commonly focus on locations where 
large numbers of people gather, such as schools, theatres, and other public 
areas. 
One problem with local-level decision making is that some localities 
inevitably choose to treat a public health crisis too casually. This 
nonchalance can be attributed to a variety of causes, such as area cultural 
differences or local political strife. The latter was the case in Philadelphia, 
widely considered the hardest-hit United States city during the 1918 
epidemic. While cases of severe influenza began to rise in the city, the 
city refused to cancel a scheduled large parade. The mayor was instead 
distracted, embroiled in a conspiracy and murder scandal.22 The parade 
continued despite city officials’ knowledge that such a gathering was 
inadvisable.23 The Liberty Loan parade hosted two hundred thousand 
celebrants in a patriotic event featuring boy scouts, soldiers, and sailors.24 
Within a few days of the parade, “the number of cases of influenza 
exploded.”25 This viral supercharging incident is eerily similar to an event 
that transpired in Wuhan, China, during the COVID-19 outbreak. On 
January 19, 2020, the City of Wuhan hosted the “Wanjia Banquet,” where 
more than 40,000 families in the community participated in a potluck.26 
Local officials had knowledge of an outbreak of an unknown disease in 
the city and nevertheless continued with the large gathering.27 Weeks 
later, Wuhan, was in the throes of an epidemic that tested the limits of the 
21. See Donald R. Olson, et al., Epidemiological evidence of an early wave of 1918 influenza 
pandemic in New York City, 102 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 11059, 11063 (2005).  
22. Christina Stetler, The 1918 Spanish Influenza, Three Months of Horror in Philadelphia, 84 
PENNSYLVANIA HIST.: A J. OF MID-ATLANTIC STUD. 462, 467 (2017).  
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 468.
26. Phoenix Network, WEIBO (Jan. 20, 2020), https://m.weibo.cn/status/4462935805605012
[https://perma.cc/36JM-WM4R]  (“On January 18, it was a traditional small year in southern China, 
and the Wanjia Banquet of Baitbuting Community in Wuhan, Hubei, was lively. More than 40,000 
families in the community presented home-made dishes and ate a group of dinner.”); Chris Buckley 
& Steven Meyers, As New Coronavirus Spread, China’s Old Habits Delayed Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/01/world/asia/china-coronavirus.html [https://
perma.cc/DP7Y-M233]. 
27. Buckley, supra note 27. 
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available medical infrastructure, a harbinger for cities such as New York 
of what was to come. Large gatherings in the midst of an outbreak are 
unquestionably a very bad practice. While a failure to cancel large public 
gatherings can lead to local epidemics, they can also cause mass 
exportation of the pathogen as seen out of Hubei province in China during 
the COVID-19 outbreak, and at a minimum serve as a poor example other 
localities may emulate. 
History also illustrates that local responses often include botched 
implementation and flawed measures. During the 1918 epidemic, the city 
of Minneapolis attempted to close movie theatres; ironically, however, 
when the impending regulations were announced, the downtown theatres 
became “packed . . . with patrons who took advantage of their last chance 
to see a performance.”28 The city gave too large a window between when 
the regulations were announced and the date of implementation, causing 
their policy to initially encourage the behavior they sought to curtail. New 
Haven, Connecticut, against the recommendation from the federal health 
agency, thought it sufficient to show slides about health on movie screens 
instead of actually closing movie theaters.29 The slides warned patrons to 
avoid coughing or sneezing during the performance; otherwise, the state 
health authorities would shutter the theatre.30 Local health officials also 
tended to promulgate regulations that had little to no effect on disease 
transmission, or not even heed their own public health advice. The 
commissioner of the State Board of Health of Minnesota advocated the 
wearing of masks during the 1918 epidemic, but did not wear one himself 
stating, “I personally prefer to take my chances.”31 Many cities also 
passed ordinances requiring proper ventilation of streetcars and theatres, 
giving commuters and patrons a false sense of security.32 In other areas, 
cutting holes in your masks to smoke cigars and cigarettes was also a 
common act of civil disobedience.33 Maladapted local public health 
actions are not a relic of the early 20th century, either. A recent study found 
that if the State of Indiana had acted earlier on the CDC’s 
28. Miles Ott, et al., Lessons Learned from the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic in Minneapolis 
and St. Paul, Minnesota, 122 PUBLIC HEALTH REP. 803, 805 (2007). 
29. Julia F. Irwin, An Epidemic without Enmity: Explaining the Missing Ethnic Tensions in
New Haven’s 1918 Influenza Epidemic, 36 URBAN HIST. REV. 5, 7 (2008). 
30. Id.
31. Ott, supra note 29, at 806 (2007). 
32. Irwin, supra note 30, at 7; Ott, supra note 29, at 806. 
33. Richard H. Peterson, The Spanish Influenza Epidemic in San Diego, 1918-1919, 71 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Q. 89, 98 (1989). 
2020] FEDERALISM AND CONTAGION 81 
recommendation, an HIV epidemic from 2011–2015 caused by 
intravenous drug use would have been cut by 90 percent.34 
What are the causes of these flawed local decisions? In many cases, 
it seems local officials do not understand the methods of disease 
transmission and the delayed impacts of social distancing measures.35 In 
some cases, it is probably appropriate to blame political expediency. Local 
officials’ decisions to close schools, cancel public gatherings, and 
substantially alter the private lives of their citizens can be unpopular, 
especially for extended periods of time. This is evidenced by citizen’s 
willful flouting of regulations and casual dismissal of their purposes, such 
as packing a theatre the day before it is scheduled to shut down.36 These 
same political incentives also encourage local officials to hide or dismiss 
an outbreak until the evidence is overwhelming. 
History also points to numerous examples of localities scapegoating 
minority groups in the midst of an outbreak. In the 1300s, some blamed 
the bubonic plague on the Jewish community, while in the 1800s, typhoid 
was pinned on the Irish, and even today, the 2009 H1N1 flu was associated 
with Mexican Americans.37 A local response to a pandemic allows for 
opportunities to discriminate against these individuals falsely seen as 
originators or harbors of the disease. One prominent example occurred in 
San Francisco’s Chinatown. During the late 1800s, the Chinese section of 
San Francisco was subject to constant ridicule as a harbor for disease, with 
little supporting evidence.38 In 1900, the City of San Francisco, in a long 
line of discriminatory actions against Chinese Americans, instituted a 
mandatory vaccination program for only Chinese residents of Chinatown. 
The vaccination program was eventually found to have been implemented 
34. Miles Parks, Pence’s New Coronavirus Role Raises Questions About His Public Health
Record, NPR (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/27/809930094/pences-new-coronavirus-
role-raises-questions-about-his-public-health-record [https://perma.cc/6FHX-NNPP]. 
35. See generally Min W. Fong et. al., Nonpharmaceutical Measures for Pandemic Influenza
in Nonhealthcare Settings – Social Distancing Measures, 26 J. EMERGING INFECTIONS DISEASES 976 
(May 2020) https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/5/19-0995_article [https://perma.cc/B2BR-
WB7D].  
36. Stetler, supra note 23, at 467. 
37. Marian Liu, The coronavirus and the long history of using diseases to justify xenophobia, 
THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 14, 2020 https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2020/02/14/coronavirus-long-history-blaming-the-other-public-health-crises/ 
[https://perma.cc/E2GA-ABHY]. 
38. Charles McClain, Of Medicine, Race and American Law: The Bubonic Plague Outbreak
of 1900, 13 L. & SOC’Y INQUIRY 447, 463 (1988) (San Francisco officials consistently referred to this 
area with contemptuous language, and a panel of city supervisors in 1885 even stated, “All great cities 
have their slums and localities where filth, disease, crime and misery abound,” in reference to 
Chinatown.).  
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on flimsy evidence of an outbreak of the plague.39 While the actions were 
eventually struck down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,40 
this situation highlights the potential for regulations promulgated by local 
officials to reflect an area’s discriminatory biases. 
A difficult lesson from history may be that local responses, clouded 
by political and immediate social considerations, are not necessarily the 
best arbiter during public health crises. While the CDC has traditionally 
acted in an advisory role to state and local governments, the agency is in 
the best position to promulgate locality-specific sanitary regulations in 
response to a pandemic. The CDC is divorced from any local political 
influences, and is well equipped with expert knowledge that local 
institutions lack. This is reflected in the CDC’s employee makeup, which 
consists of mostly scientists and public health experts.41 The current 
statutory structure instead encourages states to develop their own 
pandemic response plans, to which the Secretary can then award small 
grants during a public health emergency.42 To maximize influence, the 
CDC must cultivate relationships with state and local health departments. 
Those state and local officials then should (but are not required) to 
effectuate the policy the CDC prescribes. The CDC has previously taken 
a hands-off approach when dealing with localities. For example, in 1985, 
during the HIV epidemic, the CDC recommended contact tracing and 
regulation of houses of prostitution to local health departments but 
ultimately left those decisions to be made by localities.43 What were the 
consequences of that hands-off policy? The American approach resulted 
in a six times higher HIV infection rate compared to other less wealthy 
neighbors’ more organized responses.44 Instead of issuing broad 
recommendations, the CDC should exercise greater authority by 
promulgating region or locality-specific directives. 
In order for the CDC to gain much-needed influence over local 
policy, Congress should pass formal legislation greatly expanding the 
39. Id.
40. Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900). 
41. Denver Nicks, The CDC Has Less Power Than You Think and Likes it That Way, TIME
(Oct. 17, 2014) https://time.com/3516827/cdc-constitution-quarantine/ [https://perma.cc/CKG5-
3UJ7]. 
42. See Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub L. No. 109-417, § 201, 120 Stat.
2831, 2837–45 (2006).  
43. Verla S. Neslund, Gene W. Matthews & James W. Curran, The role of the CDC in the 
development of AIDS recommendations and guidelines, 15 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 73, 77 
(1987). 
44. Donald G. McNeil Jr., To Take On the Coronavirus, Go Medieval on It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
28, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/28/sunday-review/coronavirus-quarantine.html 
[https://perma.cc/W8YH-EDRP].  
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CDC’s grantmaking programs. In a public health emergency, the CDC 
should be statutorily empowered to award large grants to localities, on a 
precondition they adopt the CDC’s local recommendations on sanitary 
measures. Not only would potentially apprehensive localities acquiesce to 
the recommendations, but they would have significantly more resources 
to respond. Localities would have great latitude with the grants. For 
example, upon acceptance of a CDC recommendation to close area 
schools, the grant funds could be awarded to parents who have to stay 
home for childcare to supplement their lost income. Grants could also be 
awarded to businesses who are recommended to close, but stand to lose 
significant revenue as a result. 
The CDC also should exercise its informal (reputational) authority to 
influence state and local officials more aggressively. The CDC should 
issue locality-based directives in real-time, in response to a pandemic. The 
CDC is a highly respected government agency, and the opinion of its 
scientists and public health professionals is valued by the American 
public. Therefore, a CDC recommendation to close or re-open a specific 
area’s schools, businesses, or public spaces is likely to significantly 
influence local decision-makers. This recommendation also serves a dual 
purpose of lessening any potential blowback local decision-makers may 
receive. This further enables them to enact potentially unpopular social 
distancing measures, which are often critical in the control of a spreading 
disease. A more aggressive CDC on informal recommendations would 
result in better decision making on a local level in response to a pandemic. 
IV. PUBLIC HEALTH CONFINEMENT: TIME TO EXPAND THE CDC’S
AUTHORITY 
A. Jurisprudence of Quarantine and Inconsistent Application 
Another important tool in the fight against a pandemic is the use of 
quarantines and other types of isolations, decisions over which go to the 
heart of traditional police power, delegated to the states. Public health 
confinements have been exercised since the beginning of United States 
history, as infectious disease was a constant threat to public order in 
colonial America.45 The authority over quarantine and isolation represents 
more power than is obvious during that time. For example, someone 
suspected of smallpox would be isolated in a pest house, which was more 
45. Ed. Richards, The Coronavirus and the Constitution, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 10, 
2020), https://reason.com/2020/02/10/the-coronavirus-and-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/5V3H-
86EC]. 
84 CONLAWNOW [12:75 
often than not a death sentence.46 Soon after the Constitution’s 
ratification, each state subsequently passed its own quarantine laws.47 In 
the landmark early Commerce Clause case Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief 
Justice Marshall noted a state’s plenary power over “everything within the 
territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government,” including 
“quarantine laws.”48 
Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State 
Board of Health demonstrated the Supreme Court’s deference to state 
authorities in matters related to public health, including quarantines.49 In 
1898, a ship had recently docked in New Orleans with many hundreds of 
passengers. Although there was no evidence of infected passengers, they 
were not allowed to disembark upon arrival.50 The Supreme Court 
determined the State Board of Health did have the authority in this 
instance to prohibit entrance from anyone who may “increase the 
prevalence of disease.”51 This case remains a touchstone for quarantine 
law today and was recently cited in a case arising out of the 2014 African 
Ebola epidemic.52 In an earlier Supreme Court case, Smith v. Turner, some 
Justices tacitly endorsed a state-implemented border closure, if it was a 
direct public health measure.53 However, the case’s precedential value is 
questionable, given the lack of a majority opinion. At issue in this case, 
however, was not a state border closure, but a head-tax imposed by states 
on individuals landing at their ports to fund public health duties related to 
quarantines. This tax was challenged as an impermissible regulation on 
interstate commerce.54 New York argued that this tax was analogous to a 
state border closure previously allowed during epidemics, citing Governor 
Mifflin of Pennsylvania’s actions in closing the border in 1798. The 
advocate on behalf of the State of New York used colorful language to 
describe the situation. 
The rising hopes of the metropolis began to fade . . . But the leading 
spirits of that day were unwilling to give up the city without a final 
desperate effort. The havoc in the summer of 1798 is represented as 
terrific. The whole country was roused. A cordon sanitaire was thrown 
46. Id.
47. Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense 
against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 329, 333 n.18 (1989). 
48. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 186, 203 (1824). 
49. 186 U.S. 380 (1902). 
50. Id. at 382.
51. Id. at 385.
52. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 591 (D.N.J. 2016).
53. See 48 U.S. 283, 340-41 (1849). 
54. See id. 
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around the city. Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania proclaimed a non-
intercourse between New York and Philadelphia.55 
While the Court struck down the New York-imposed head tax per 
passenger56, Senior Justice McLean indicated he might rule otherwise, if 
the action more closely resembled a public health measure. McLean 
wrote, “In giving the commercial power to Congress the States did not 
part with that power of self-preservation which must be inherent in every 
organized community. They may guard against the introduction of any 
thing which may . . . endanger the health . . . of their citizens.”57 Thus, 
McLean viewed a state’s power to exclude potentially infectious 
individuals inherent in a state’s police power, and not an impermissible 
impediment of interstate commerce. 
As previously mentioned, the power to quarantine and isolate has 
often been viewed as entirely subsumed in a state’s police power. 
However, this power has been used by localities in ways that endanger 
civil liberties and do not further public health. For example, from the 
1870s through 1910, governments in the South implemented what were 
known as “shotgun quarantines.”58 These quarantines purported to defend 
areas against the scourge of yellow fever. Quarantines, however, did little 
to stop the spread because mosquitoes are the viral vector. To enforce 
these town-by-town quarantines, local governments posted armed 
individuals (hence the shotgun title) to prevent entry from places in which 
yellow fever was believed to be present.59 Decisions on the imposition of 
local quarantines were usually made arbitrarily by ill-informed local 
politicians and often at a moment’s notice when a case of yellow fever 
appeared elsewhere.60 During this time period, states even lobbied the 
federal government to step in and rein in the destructive use of these 
quarantines.61 Predictably, these quarantines devastated commerce by 
halting the movement of trains and people exacting a significant human 
cost.62 They pitted town against town and halted the movement of 
commerce. Even today, during the COVID-19 outbreak, there is an 
example of these shotgun (lite) style quarantines. Dare County in North 
55. See id at syllabus.
56. Id. at 572.
57. Id. at 400.
58. Polly J. Price, Epidemics, Outsiders, and Local Protection: Federalism Theatre in the Era 
of Shotgun Quarantine 19 J. Const. L. 369, 371 (2016). 
59. Id.
60. Id. at 377.
61. Id. at 382.
62. Id. at 371.
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Carolina recently decided to restrict access to the county.63 The county 
established checkpoints at all entry points in order to prevent the 
introduction of COVID-19 in the county. If more local governments 
decide to enact similar measures, this patchwork of laws would hinder 
economic activity, and work against an effective national pandemic 
response. 
B. Current Authorities 
The federal government has played a role in quarantine and isolation 
since the beginning of United States history. The first federal quarantine 
act was signed in 1796 in response to a yellow fever epidemic.64 This law 
only permitted assistance to localities with quarantines upon request, and 
did not allow unilateral imposition by the federal government.65 
Subsequent outbreaks of cholera from arriving passenger ships resulted in 
the federal government gaining more authority over quarantine.66 In 1893, 
Congress passed a law that clarified the role of the federal government, 
and gradually international border quarantine stations were turned over to 
the federal government.67 Finally, in 1944, Congress clearly established 
the federal government’s authority for quarantine at the international 
border level.68 Pursuant to Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act, 
the Surgeon General is authorized to take measures to prevent the entry 
of communicable diseases into the United States,69 the authority over 
which is delegated to the CDC.70 The CDC is authorized to detain, 
medically examine, and release individuals arriving into the United States 
63. COVID-19 Bulletin #2, DARE COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT JOINT INFORMATION 
CENTER (Mar. 17, 2020) https://www.darenc.com/Home/Components/News/News/5970/17 
[https://perma.cc/Y3PB-U3VH]. 
64. Christopher Ogolla, Non-Criminal Habeas Corpus for Quarantine and Isolation
Detainees: Serving the Private Right or Violating Public Policy, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 135, 
154 (2011).  
65. Arjun K. Jaikumar, Red Flags in Federal Quarantine: The Questionable 
Constitutionality of Federal Quarantine after NFIB v. Sebelius, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
677, 686 (2014). 
66. History of Quarantine, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Jan. 10, 2012)
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/historyquarantine.html [https://perma.cc/84MW-FNB6]. 
67. Id.
68. Joseph P. Topinka, Yaw, Pitch and Roll: Quarantine and Isolation at United States Airports, 
30 J.L. 
Med. 51, 58 (2009). 
69. 42 U.S.C § 264(a) (2002). 
70. 42 C.F.R. § 70 (2000). 
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who are suspected of carrying certain types of communicable disease,71 
which are outlined in executive orders.72 The CDC maintains quarantine 
stations at ports of entry and land-border crossings throughout the United 
States.73 
While the federal government has vast quarantine powers at the 
borders, the policy and implementation beyond the port of entry is left to 
local and state health departments. The current view in regard to intrastate 
quarantine authority is that the federal government may not interfere with 
a state’s choice unless the state asks for assistance, or until the epidemic 
crosses state lines.74 While Congress intensely debated taking full control 
over local quarantine law in 1898 and 1906, they chose not to act.75 
Congress instead passed the “Interstate Quarantine Law,” which gave the 
federal government some interstate quarantine authority, but did not 
explicitly authorize the preemption of local quarantines and was never 
enforced.76 Today, states exercise the right to quarantine and isolate 
individuals in response to their own laws and policy under their police 
powers.77 The CDC elaborates on its authority as follows: 
In general, CDC defers to the state and local health authorities in their 
primary use of their own separate quarantine powers. Based upon long 
experience and collaborative working relationships with our state and 
local partners, CDC continues to anticipate the need to use this federal 
authority to quarantine an exposed person only in rare situations, such 
as events at ports of entry or in similar time sensitive settings.78 
Regarding interstate quarantine and isolation authority, the CDC is 
authorized under 42 C.F.R. 70 to detain, isolate, and quarantine 
individuals for the purpose of preventing the interstate spread of 
communicable diseases. Similar to ports of entry quarantines, the CDC 
has rarely, if ever, moved to exercise their interstate isolation and 
quarantine authority, leaving the extent of this power untested. However, 
the CDC stipulates they reserve the right to use this provision within the 
United States, “where measures taken by [local] authorities are inadequate 
71. Isolation and Quarantine, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html 
[https://perma.cc/52HF-3FJU]. 
72. Exec. Order No. 13,295, 3 C.F.R. § 13295 (2003). 
73. A Comprehensive Quarantine System, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/quarantinestations.html [https://perma.cc/D3QJ-ZDXC]. 
74. Price, supra note 59, at 369. 
75. Id. at 398. 
76. Id. at 405.
77. Swendiman, supra note 12, at 7. 
78. Swendiman, supra note 12, at 7–8. 
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to prevent communicable disease spread.”79 This statement comes without 
the teeth of likely federal enforcement, as the CDC has very few ground 
personnel. There are over 2,684 state and local health departments who 
are tasked with the monitoring and management of their own 
jurisdictions.80 
C. Resolving the CDC’s Quarantine Power 
The CDC’s power over quarantines within the United States is 
ambiguous and has rarely been tested. At the same time, the agency, with 
its vast institutional knowledge, is in the best position to dictate national 
quarantine action in the face of a pandemic. Where the CDC’s authority 
is clear (international border quarantines), the agency has been highly 
effective at containing disease outbreaks. During the 2002–2003 SARS 
epidemic, the CDC met approximately 12,000 flights with passengers 
arriving from affected areas.81 Upon the report of an ill passenger, the 
CDC quarantine staff met each arriving passenger immediately for a 
personal risk assessment. The CDC’s effort to combat SARS ended 
successfully, with only 27 confirmed cases in the United States and zero 
fatalities.82 
Today, without the CDC’s involvement, inconsistent local 
quarantines have the potential to further the spread of disease and do 
significant harm during an outbreak. During the 2014 Ebola outbreak, four 
state governors enforced much different quarantines than what was 
recommended by the CDC.83 This led to charges of attempts to score 
political points in the midst of public fear.84 The rise of populism and 
reactionary politicians make a scenario where states attempt to exercise 
their police power over quarantine in ways contrary to the federal 
government’s policy more likely. A central decisionmaker like the CDC 
79. Q & As about the Final Rule for Control of Communicable Diseases: Interstate (Domestic) 
and Foreign Quarantine, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Mar. 21, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/qa-final-rule-communicable-diseases.html [https://perma.cc/9X5U-
VQB7]. 
80. Polly J. Price, A Coronavirus Quarantine in America Could Be a Giant Legal Mess, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb 16, 2020) https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/coronavirus-
quarantine-america-could-be-giant-legal-mess/606595/ [https://perma.cc/B7UK-YRX5]. 
81. Martin Cetron et. al., Isolation and Quarantine: Containment Strategies for SARS 2003,
Workshop Summary, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK92450/ [https://perma.cc/A3XP-
V7RW]. 
82. Chris Woolston, SARS, The Epidemic That Was Halted, HEALTH DAY (Jan. 1, 2020)
https://consumer.healthday.com/encyclopedia/diseases-and-conditions-15/misc-diseases-and-
conditions-news-203/sars-648365.html [https://perma.cc/Q2TB-77FE].  
83. Price, supra note 59, at 371.
84. Id.
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is essential to organize this chaos. The implementation of real-time 
quarantine directives from the CDC (instead of direction from local public 
health departments) would ameliorate this possible collective action 
problem between localities, analogous to the social distancing ordinances 
previously noted. The CDC also retains a much larger knowledge base 
than state and local governments and employs some of the nation’s top 
scientists and public health experts. These experts are necessary to weigh 
the costs and benefits of confinement actions, as a balance must be struck 
between sometimes draconian measures and the social, economic, and 
personal costs they exact. 
In order to implement the above recommendations, Congress must 
statutorily enable the CDC to preempt local quarantine laws as well as 
fully fund local enforcement capabilities. The constitutionality of such 
laws is addressed below. If Congress does not issue a clear directive, an 
effort by the CDC to control quarantines will inevitably lead to confusion 
about who is leading the effort. Even recent history suggests if a 
significant outbreak of a disease were to occur, the allocation of power 
between the states and federal government (CDC) will be a subject of 
significant controversy. Congress must act and clarify the federal 
government’s role in quarantines within the United States. 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. General Authority 
The CDC’s authority is remarkably broad in regard to communicable 
disease. The authorizing statute, the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), 
provides: 
The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized 
to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary 
to prevent the spread of communicable diseases . . . from one State or 
possession into any other State or possession.85 
The authority of the Surgeon General is shared with the CDC.86 According 
to the statute, the CDC has some authority over the interstate spread of 
communicable diseases. The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether this 
portion of the PHSA is within the limits of the Commerce Clause. 
If the statute were challenged, it would likely be upheld on 
Commerce Clause grounds. Under its Commerce Clause power, Congress 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012).
86. See Isolation and Quarantine, supra note 72. 
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has the authority to regulate any activity that “substantially affects 
interstate commerce.”87 Implicit in this test are two additional 
requirements: that the regulatory subject be economic in nature88, and that 
Congress not compel inactive citizens to enter a market in which they 
were not already participating.89 Authority to quarantine during a 
nationwide pandemic satisfies all these elements. 
First, large communicable disease events such as a pandemic 
dramatically affect interstate commerce. Consequently, regulations 
curtailing certain activities that promote disease spread should also fall 
within Congress’s commerce power. A pandemic can drive up demand 
for healthcare services significantly, thus affecting prices throughout the 
country. The economic impact of a substantial pandemic in the United 
States was estimated by some researchers to amount to 166 billion 
dollars,90 which now looks like a significant underestimate after COVID-
19. During oral arguments for United States v. Comstock91, Justice Scalia
stated that “if anything relates to interstate commerce, it’s communicable 
disease, it seems to me.”92 Communicable diseases do not respect state 
borders and are inherently an interstate problem that “substantially affects 
commerce.”93 In that same vein of reasoning, Congress could also 
conceivably grant the CDC more latitude to influence local 
sanitary/disease regulations under their Commerce Clause power. 
Next, the regulated activity must be economic in nature.94 This 
question is an easy one when the activity involves regulating schools, 
stores, restaurants, or sporting events. No one would argue that those 
activities, commonly ordered closed during “stay at home orders” are not 
economic in nature. The cessation of economic activity must also have an 
interstate effect. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court upheld the Controlled 
Substances Act, noting, “Prohibiting the intrastate possession or 
87. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
88. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
89. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012). 
90. See Martin Meltzer et. al., The Economic Impact of Pandemic Influenza in the United
States: Priorities for Intervention, 5 J. EMERGING INFECTIONS DISEASES 659, 659 (1999) 
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/5/5/99-0507_article [https://perma.cc/Z2E3-NKGK] (this impact 
is certainly a very low estimate considering the trillions of dollars lost to the COVID-19 pandemic).  
91. 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
92. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010) (No.
08-1224).  
93. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613. (“While we need not adopt a categorical rule 
against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in 
our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only 
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94. Id.
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manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly 
utilized) means of regulating commerce.”95 Many activities banned during 
quarantine are analogous to Raich, because they may exclusively take 
place intrastate, but in the aggregate have significant interstate commerce 
effects. A prohibition on people going to work, stores, schools, and 
entertainment venues results in a dramatic reduction in nationwide 
economic activity. 
The more difficult question are activities that facially appear less 
economic in nature (but often regulated under “stay at home orders”) such 
as visiting friends or going to the park. While those activities may not be 
immediately economic in nature, choosing to partake in them during a 
pandemic, nonetheless, can have significant interstate commerce effects. 
In Morrison, the court found that the federally regulated activity (violence 
against women) was sufficiently non-economic enough that it could not 
be regulated under the Commerce Clause.96 Ostensibly non-economic 
activities listed above, which undoubtedly fall under Morrison during 
normal times, have the potential to cause far-reaching negative economic 
effects during a pandemic. For example, meatpacking plants have dealt 
with large outbreaks of COVID-19, causing meat prices to increase and 
shortages throughout the country.97 It takes only one person, after visiting 
friends, to seed an outbreak that potentially shuts down the entire 
processing plant affecting supply chains across the country. Generally, 
people congregating anywhere during a pandemic has the potential to 
dramatically affect interstate commerce, because people becoming ill has 
a dramatic effect on economic activity. 
Finally, post NFIB v. Sebelius, the government may not compel 
inactive citizens to enter a market. However, curtailing public activities is 
materially different from the individual mandate to buy health insurance 
in NFIB v. Sebelius.98 In NFIB, the federal government was compelling 
non-participants to enter the health insurance market. In the case of an 
intrastate quarantine, market participants are ordered to leave temporarily, 
distinguishing it from NFIB. 
95. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005). 
96. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
97. Taylor Telford and Kimberly Kindy, As they rushed to maintain U.S. meat supply, big
processors saw plants become covid-19 hot spots, worker illnesses spike, WASH. POST (April 25, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/25/meat-workers-safety-jbs-smithfield-
tyson/ [https://perma.cc/JB9P-4QL2]. 
98. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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B. Local Directive 
A dramatic expansion of the CDC grant program to influence state 
and local government policy would be an important tool in managing a 
pandemic. However, using federal funds to strongly influence state policy 
raises 10th Amendment questions under the anti-commandeering 
doctrine. This doctrine is based on the conception of dual sovereignty, 
where the “separation of the two spheres [state and federal] is one of the 
Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.”99 Thus, the CDC (being 
an agency of the federal government) is not legally able to order state or 
local public health officials into action.100 The most modern test is from 
NFIB, which talks about the level of coercion. In NFIB, the Court 
considered it too coercive to condition all Medicaid funding on 
acceptance of the expansion. That is, states who refused to comply risked 
losing both new and existing Medicaid funds.101 
These grants would not be so coercive as to contravene the 10th 
Amendment under Congressional tax and spending authority. This is 
consistent with NFIB because, in this proposal, there is no threat to lose 
all existing federal funding directed at public health crises. In NFIB, states 
did not have “a genuine choice whether to accept the offer” because they 
risked losing their current Medicaid funding entirely.102 However, the 
proposed specialized CDC grant program comes with no risk of losing 
existing federal funds. This prescribed system of awarding grants for 
compliance with CDC’s concurrent directives retains a state’s police 
power while bringing in federal expertise in decision making. 
C. CDC Authority Over Confinements Within the United States 
The Supremacy Clause establishes the Constitution and federal laws 
as the supreme law of the land, thus it invalidates state laws that interfere 
or are contrary to federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, 
Congressional action may directly preempt state law. There is a general 
consensus that even state laws related to health and safety are not exempt 
from invalidation under the Supremacy Clause.103 
The federal government’s ability to preempt state public health 
confinements such as quarantines and isolations is within the bounds of 
99. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997). 
 100.  See Printz 521 U.S. at 935 (“Congress cannot compel the states to enact or enforce a federal 
regulatory program”). See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (take title provision).  
101.  See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
102.  Id. at 588.  
103.  LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 80 (3rd ed. 2016).  
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the Constitution. The Supreme Court has suggested Congress would have 
power over the states in this respect if it chose to legislate on the subject. 
In Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, the Supreme 
Court upheld quarantine rules employed by Louisiana.104 Importantly, the 
Court noted that if Congress were to implement a general system of 
quarantine or “confide the execution of the details of such a system to a 
National Board of Health . . . all State laws on the subject will be 
abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent.”105 This direct 
invitation for Congress to legislate and preempt state quarantines never 
came to fruition.106 In Louisiana v. Texas, a concurrence suggested that 
Congress may intervene in local public health confinements.107 At issue 
in this case was an objection to the state of Texas’ border closure to 
Louisiana, which resulted from a case of yellow fever that appeared in 
New Orleans.108 The plaintiff Louisiana argued the border closure was an 
impediment to interstate commerce, thus violating the Commerce 
Clause.109 The Court dismissed the case without addressing the 
Commerce Clause issue for lack of standing.110 In a concurrence, Justice 
Harlan wrote: “The police power of a State cannot be so exerted as to 
obstruct foreign or interstate commerce beyond the necessity of its 
exercise, and that that the courts must guard vigilantly against needless 
intrusion upon the field committed to Congress.”111 In both of these cases, 
the Supreme Court considered it within the right of Congress to preempt 
state and local quarantine regulations. 
If Congress chooses to grant the CDC with more power to control 
local quarantines and influence local health policy with an expanded 
discretionary grant program, it would likely be constitutional. The power 
to set these policies is within the bounds of the Commerce Clause because 
the underlying economic activity has a substantial impact on interstate 
commerce. The grant program would not violate the Tenth Amendment 
because it conditions only new funding on participation, not existing 
funds. Additionally, the Supreme Court has previously acknowledged the 
right of Congress to preempt state and local regulation in this area, despite 
a background principle of state police power. 
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VI. CONCLUSION
Government officials are tasked with the challenging job of 
responding to public health crises, notwithstanding the difficulties current 
public health federalism poses. During public health crises, areas of 
conflict between states and the federal government include local 
ordinances and quarantine decisions. To organize the chaos, there must be 
increased leadership from the federal government, particularly the CDC. 
The suggested changes include large grant programs administered by 
the CDC, more aggressive informal influence from the CDC, and 
Congressional preemption of state quarantine measures. It should not be 
forgotten that methods of coercion to control the spread of disease have 
costs as well. Travel bans, decreased social mixing, quarantines, and 
isolations may slow the progression of a disease, but these measures exact 
personal, social, and economic costs. Further, strong governmental 
intervention may cause fear amongst the population and a general distrust 
in government. These reactions may undermine the efforts of the public 
health response in the first place. The federal government is more 
insulated from local political pressures, and thus better suited to absorb 
this type of criticism without deleterious effects on policy. It is imperative 
the U.S. gain control over the current and future epidemics. Countries and 
areas that do will reap large economic and social rewards. Rebalancing 
the law to favor federal leadership will take pressure off of local decision-
makers and create a more effective response to future pandemics. 
